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Abstract
Context
Research has documented the problem of medication administration errors and their
causes. However, little is known about how nurses administer medications safely or how
existing systems facilitate or hinder medication administration; this represents a missed
opportunity for implementation of practical, effective, and low-cost strategies to increase
safety.
Aim
To identify system factors that facilitate and/or hinder successful medication administration
focused on three inter-related areas: nurse practices and workarounds, workflow, and inter-
ruptions and distractions.
Methods
We used a mixed-methods ethnographic approach involving observational fieldwork, field
notes, participant narratives, photographs, and spaghetti diagrams to identify system fac-
tors that facilitate and/or hinder successful medication administration in three inpatient
wards, each from a different English NHS trust. We supplemented this with quantitative
data on interruptions and distractions among other established medication safety
measures.
Findings
Overall, 43 nurses on 56 drug rounds were observed. We identified a median of 5.5 interrup-
tions and 9.6 distractions per hour. We identified three interlinked themes that facilitated
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successful medication administration in some situations but which also acted as barriers in
others: (1) system configurations and features, (2) behaviour types among nurses, and (3)
patient interactions. Some system configurations and features acted as a physical con-
straint for parts of the drug round, however some system effects were partly dependent on
nurses’ inherent behaviour; we grouped these behaviours into ‘task focused’, and ‘patient-
interaction focused’. The former contributed to a more streamlined workflow with fewer inter-
ruptions while the latter seemed to empower patients to act as a defence barrier against
medication errors by being: (1) an active resource of information, (2) a passive information
resource, and/or (3) a ‘double-checker’.
Conclusions
We have identified practical examples of system effects on work optimisation and nurse
behaviours that potentially increase medication safety, and conceptualized ways in which
patient involvement can increase medication safety in hospitals.
Introduction
Medication administration errors (MAEs) occur in 8.0% to 19.6% of doses in hospitals world-
wide [1]. Although these figures should be interpreted with some caution due to important dif-
ferences among studies [2], it is clear that MAEs are common. Even in countries where MAE
rates appear relatively low, such as the United Kingdom (5.6% of non-intravenous doses admin-
istered to adult hospital inpatients [2]), it has been estimated that 0.6–21% of MAEs may lead
to severe patient harm [3]. Considering the vast number of medication administrations that
occur, the actual number of patients that suffer harm is likely to be substantial. However, while
many studies have measured the incidence of MAEs [1,2] and identified causes that arise from
both individuals and systems [4], few have examined this area from the other perspective: how
do nurses work within hospital systems to administer medications safely and successfully?
A system is any set of interdependent elements or processes interacting to achieve a common
aim [5]. High-profile public inquiries and reports [5–11] provide a stark reminder that while
humans err, systems can fail. In some cases, system failures that contributed to patient suffering
were also the result of an organizational culture that disproportionately prioritized achieving
financial targets over providing quality patient care [12]. System-based failures in healthcare
organizations can occur in any processes and are likely to be important underlying contributory
factors for recurring medication errors [5,10,13]. Poorly designed systems and overly compli-
cated processes can increase the risk of an error occurring, while intuitive user-centred designed
systems and more streamlined or simpler processes may reduce this risk [13,14].
In the context of hospital drug administration rounds, persistent system-related challenges
such as medicines not being available, limited equipment, inefficient workflow and frequent
interruptions are known contributors to MAEs [15,16]. However, variation in ward-based sys-
tems (such as medication ordering, storage and transport systems) exist within and between
countries [3,17,18]; research suggests such variation can affect the frequency of different types
of MAEs [19–22]. While it is important that such causes of MAEs are identified, this only pro-
vides us with information about which systems and processes do not work well. It does not tell
us which do work well. For instance, studies of reworks and workarounds associated with med-
ication administration suggest that alternative and sometimes ‘deviant’ processes (which may
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also be procedural failures, violations, shortcuts or improvisations) are relatively common and
can create ‘more holes in the system’, bypassing essential safety defence barriers, and thereby
increasing the risk of a medication safety incident occurring [23–26]. However, in some cases,
alternative or deviant processes may be deliberate pre-emptive actions taken by an individual
to increase efficiency or to overcome known error-prone system-based failures [25]. Thus,
alternative processes may act as an indicator of underlying latent conditions for future inci-
dents [13]. It is therefore important to not only identify potential contributory factors for
MAEs but also how individuals manage them within the resources available.
We aimed to address this knowledge gap by identifying and describing system factors that
facilitate and/or hinder successful medication administration, focused on three interrelated
areas: (1) individual nurse practices and workarounds, (2) medication administration work-
flow, and (3) the frequency and nature of interruptions and distractions during medication
administration.
Methods
This was a mixed methods ethnographic study of medication administration by nursing staff
in three wards, each in a different English National Health Service (NHS) hospital trust. Study
wards were purposively selected to represent a range of inpatient medication systems; the sam-
pling frame was based on findings from our national survey of hospital medication systems
[27]. One ward (site A) was selected as a ‘typical’ English inpatient ward (including paper med-
ication prescription charts, patient bedside medication lockers plus drug trolleys, and the use
of patients’ own medications where appropriate). One ward (site B) used an established elec-
tronic prescribing and medication administration (EPMA) system (since 2008). The final ward
(site C) used a relatively new EPMA system (since July 2012) and had two nurses administering
medication together to each patient. Other ward characteristics and dates of observation are
summarised in Table 1.
Ethics statement
NHS research ethics approval was not required as this study met the criteria for service evalua-
tion and focused on staff as participants [28]. Academic research ethics approval was granted
by the School of Pharmacy, University of London, in January 2011. All participants provided
written consent.
Data collection
Nurses mainly administered medications during scheduled drug rounds (Table 1); data collec-
tion therefore focused around these times. A convenience sample of nurses was observed by
one experienced pharmacist researcher (MM) for seven to ten consecutive days on each ward.
Prior to starting observations, MM went through a participant information leaflet with the
nurse concerned, answered any questions and requested written consent. Observations were
divided into ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’: each was conducted during separate drug rounds.
MM observed nursing staff as they went about their usual routines before, during and after
scheduled rounds. The start time, duration, number of patients, and number of steps taken by
the nurse (using a pedometer, Yamax Digi-Walker SW-200) during each observed drug round
were documented. During the first set of observed drug rounds (qualitative), detailed descrip-
tions of the medication administration processes and systems were documented as field notes,
photographs, ‘spaghetti diagrams’ (maps of the ward annotated by hand to show nurses’ walk-
ing patterns during drug rounds), and narratives. Field notes ranged from including the great-
est level of detail, described by Lofland and Lofland [29] as ‘practices’ (an activity that the
Medication Administration Processes and Systems
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participants regard as unremarkable normal feature of on-going life), to the highest level ‘life-
styles or subcultures’ (the global adjustments to life by large numbers of similarly situated per-
sons). The level of detail to be abstracted during observations was not determined a priori as
we wished to explore interactions at different levels between ‘humans’ and ‘systems’. During
the second set of observed drug rounds (quantitative), additional quantitative data plus explan-
atory field notes were documented: details of the medicines administered, storage locations
accessed, and the number and sources of interruptions and distractions. Data collection was
not focused on detecting MAEs; however the number of observed opportunities for error (as
defined below) was documented so that the MAE rate could also be calculated if any MAEs
were observed.
Definitions and categories
To facilitate interpretation of our quantitative findings [2] we used Allan and Barker’s [30]
MAE definition: a deviation from the prescriber’s medication order as written on the patient’s
chart. Errors prevented by the patient or persons other than the nurse themselves were also
Table 1. Characteristics of study wards and summary of data collected.
Study wards Stafﬁng Medication systems and
administration processes
Observations
Site A: 27-bed vascular/
cardiology ward in an acute
NHS trust
24 nurses. Observed nurse to
patient ratio 1:8 on both day shift
and night shift. Nurse participants
reported fewer staff than usual
during the data collection period
Paper drug prescription and
administration chart; four drug trolleys;
RFID controlled electronic bedside
medication cabinets; nurses
administered drugs to patients they were
looking after; patient’s own drugs from
home were permitted to be used during
their inpatient stay.
26 March to 3 April 2012; 14 nurses
(includes 2 bank/agency)a (13 female;
1 male); 18 drug rounds (three at 6am
and ﬁve each at 12pm, 6pm and
10pm); total 27 hours of observation, of
which 15 hours 20 min were during
drug rounds; 11 hours 40 min were
before and after drug rounds.
Site B: 28-bed adult elective
surgical ward in an acute
hospital of a foundation NHS
trust
16 nurses. Observed nurse to
patient ratio 1:6 on both day shift
and night shift. Nurse participants
reported fewer patients than usual
during the data collection period
Trust-wide EPMA system since 2008;
EPMA access: two desktop computers,
three tablet devices, and one COW; two
drug trolleys; RFID controlled bedside
medication cabinets; nurses
administered drugs to patients they were
looking after; patient’s own drugs from
home were permitted to be used during
their inpatient stay.
20–31 August 2012; 13 nurses
(includes 2 bank/agency)a (12 female;
1 male); 20 drug rounds (four at 6am,
ﬁve at 12pm, six at 6pm, and ﬁve at
10pm); total 29 hours of observation, of
which 14 hours 13 min were during
drug rounds; 14 hours 47 min were
before and after drug rounds.
Site C: 18-bed adult
neurological rehabilitation
ward in an acute hospital of
a foundation NHS trust
15 nurses. Observed nurse to
patient ratio 1:9 on both day shift
and night shift. Nurse participants
reported fewer staff than normal
during the data collection period
EPMA system since July 2012, trust-
wide roll out in progress at time of data
collection; EPMA access: one desktop
computer, one laptop attached to the
drug trolley, and two COWs; one large
drug trolley; conventional metal bedside
medication lockers; two nurses
administered drugs to all patients
together; ‘opt-out’ patient self-
administration policy; patients’ own
drugs from home were permitted to be
used during their inpatient stay; HCAs
helped patients to take their medications
after the nurse had prepared the doses.
12–19 November 2012; 16 nurses
(includes 3 bank/agency)a (13 female;
3 male); 18 drug rounds (two at 6am,
four at 8am, four at 12pm, ﬁve at 6pm,
and three at 10pm); total 29 hours of
observation, of which 20 hours 35 min
were during drug rounds; 8 hours 25
min were before and after drug rounds;
no IV doses were prescribed (patients
on this ward do not usually require IVs).
Abbreviations: COW, computer on wheels; EPMA, electronic prescribing and medication administration system; HCA, health care assistant; IV,
intravenous; NHS, National Health Service; RFID, radio frequency identiﬁcation.
aBank nurses were employees of the hospital trust who may also be a regular staff member of the study ward. Agency nurses were employees of an
external company who were contracted by the hospital trust to provide nursing staff cover to wards for speciﬁc work shifts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.t001
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included as MAEs. The following were excluded as MAEs: wrong time, doses omitted for thera-
peutic reasons or due to the patient not being on the ward, and procedural violations such as
not checking the patient’s allergy status or leaving a dose at the patient’s bedside for the patient
to self-administer. All doses where both preparation and administration were observed were
included as opportunities for error (OE); the total number of OEs was the denominator for cal-
culating MAE rates. Detailed definitions of these are provided elsewhere [3].
There is no standard operational definition for an interruption or distraction, or standard
categories for the source of the interruption or distraction [31]. We therefore adapted previous
definitions [16,31,32]: an interruption was defined as a situation in which a nurse ceased the
medication preparation, administration and/or documentation task before it was complete
[31,32] and a distraction was a stimulus from a source external to the nurse that was not fol-
lowed by cessation of activity but by the nurse continuing productive efforts while responding
in an observable manner [32]. Specific sources of interruptions and distractions were grouped
into 16 categories [31,33]; detailed definitions of the sources of interruptions and distractions
are reported elsewhere [3].
Data analysis
All data were transcribed within 24 hours of observation to maximize recall, identify further
areas to focus subsequent observations, and facilitate concomitant data analysis during data
collection. Qualitative data were analysed using a framework approach [34]; an initial high
level thematic framework based on the study objectives was produced which comprised: medi-
cation systems available, use of medication systems in practice, medication safety, drug round
workflow, and interruptions and distractions. MM analysed all data and further developed the
framework; BDF independently reviewed several iterations of the expanded thematic frame-
work, verified the coding schemes and indexed two sets of field notes from each study ward
(approximately 10% of all field notes). The final coding scheme and thematic framework were
produced after further iterative work by MM and BDF. Quantitative data were summarized
descriptively. MAE rates were calculated for both non-IV doses and IV doses [2] as a percent-
age of the total number of OEs observed. Separate and combined interruption and distraction
rates per drug round hour were also calculated [31,35].
Authenticity, plausibility, and criticality
We used three interpretative criteria to increase validity of our findings: authenticity, plausibil-
ity, and criticality [36]. Authenticity has been described as “immersion in the case through
extended fieldwork” [36]; we report in our findings a range of evidence to demonstrate this.
Plausibility is “developing explanations of local phenomena which made sense to participants
and drawing these together into a coherent overall narrative” [36]; this was achieved through
feedback and discussions with participants at the end of the observation period at each site.
Criticality is the systematic questioning of assumptions made in describing the explanations of
the phenomena under study. Both plausibility and criticality considerations also formed a key
component of the data analysis by having two researchers (MM and BDF) analyse the data iter-
atively until both agreed on the final themes.
Results
Overall, 85 hours and 43 different nurses on 56 drug rounds (26 qualitative and 30 quantita-
tive) were observed across the three study wards (Table 1). One newly qualified nurse who ini-
tially declined later agreed to be observed when she was able to give medications unsupervised.
Medication Administration Processes and Systems
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All other nurses consented to participate. Verbal nursing feedback suggested that they did not
mind being observed and many expressed interest in the study.
During the quantitative observations, 458 doses were included as OEs (445 non-IV and 13
IV doses). The MAE rates were 2.7% of non-IV OEs (95% confidence interval (CI), 1.2 to 4.2)
and 30.8% of IV OEs (95% CI, 26.3 to 35.2).
We identified three inter-related themes that encompassed the five main areas in our initial
thematic framework; a sixth, ‘observer-related effects’, was added to reflect actual and potential
effects of having an observer on both nurse and patient behaviour (Fig 1). The three inter-
related themes were: (1) structure—related to configurations and features of the medication
systems, (2) behaviour—referring to different types of nursing staff behaviour, and (3) patient
interactions—referring to the two-way interaction between a nurse and a patient. Structure was
the foundational theme that affected different types of nurse behaviour, which in turn, incited
different types of patient interactions; each comprised components that exerted a positive and/
or negative impact on medication safety, drug round workflow, interruptions and distractions.
‘Structure’—system configurations and features
Specific configurations (location and arrangement of human and material resources) and
features (characteristics, interpretability, and pre-conditions for use) of structure-related
Fig 1. Conceptual overview of thematic factors that influencemedication administration errors, workflow, interruptions and distractions
associated with the hospital medication administration process. There are three over-arching interlinked themes: structure, behaviour, and patient
interactions that encompass the six main areas (numbered). Arrows indicate the direction of influence between areas. Dotted lines indicate the presence of
the observer as an artefact of the research directly on nursing staff behaviour, and on interruptions and distractions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g001
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aspects [37] of the medication system acted as a physical constraint on some drug round tasks.
Such structure-related aspects increased medication safety in some cases, but contributed to
interruptions, distractions, impaired workflow, and medication problems in others (Table 2,
Figs 2 to 5).
Table 2. Examples of system configurations and features, and their potential positive and negative
effects onmedication safety, workflow, interruptions and distractions.
Potential positive aspects of system
conﬁgurations and features
Potential negative aspects of system
conﬁgurations and features
Facilitating medication preparation next to drug
chart/EPMA system (1) A desktop computer was
near the stock cupboard for oral medicines, thus
allowing nursing staff to check the EMAR while
preparing medicines that may not be available from
the drug trolley; (2) The patient bedside medication
locker was a removable drawer which could be
moved to an alternative area while preparing
medicines (for example, if there was limited space
at the locker to place the drug chart or mobile
EPMA device, or if more than one drug was
required from the bedside medication locker).
Practicalities of the drug chart/EPMA system (1)Drug
administration codes for ‘patient refused’ and ‘patient
did not require’ were used interchangeably Reported
unreliability of tablet computer devices and font size
too small on laptop led to nurses reporting a
preference for using the desktop computer on some
drug rounds. This meant that the EMAR was
sometimes not used at the patient’s bedside or at
the drug preparation location (e.g. treatment room);
(2) Password and training required to use EPMA
system, therefore EPMA could not be used by
agency staff. Instead, regular nursing staff printed
out medication administration records for agency
staff and transcribed medication administration
documentation on to the EPMA system after each
drug round (signature on EPMA system was of the
transcribing nurse).
Facilitating medication retrieval during drug round
(1) Some patients kept their bedside medications
together in a box which seemed to make it easier
for nursing staff to ﬁnd medications not stored in the
bedside medication locker, for example, creams
and inhalers; (2) Medications in the drug trolley
were arranged such that the front (rather than the
side) of most packs were facing the nurse to aid
identiﬁcation: (3) Drug trolley was kept in the
treatment room and was often replenished
immediately prior to and/or after the drug round; (4)
Drug trolley was kept in the treatment room which
also had a fridge; fridge items were placed in the
drug trolley prior to starting the drug round.
Travel (1)Not all the medications or equipment (drug
charts, keys, paper/plastic medicine cups) required
during the drug rounds were available at the
patient’s bedside. Some may be temporarily placed
elsewhere but others such as infusion pump
equipment were located in a separate room some
distance away from the patient’s bedside and
potentially increased travel for nurses; (2) The day
room was located some distance away from the
patient bed areas which was a particular problem on
one ward as some patients were mobile and were
often in the day room during drug rounds; thus
potentially increased travel and opportunities for
interruptions.
Reducing interruptions and distractions (1) Ward
staff developed a standard form for documenting
medication-related tasks that required follow-up
after the drug round; (2) Ward staff placed a ‘ward
screen’ at the entrance of a bay in which patients
were being washed, this discouraged interruptions
to anyone inside the bay including interruptions to
nurses who were carrying out the drug round at the
same time; (3) Nurse checked EPMA at the nurse
station prior to starting lunchtime drug round for
doses that were due. Nurse expected very few
doses and did not use drug trolley on the drug
round but prepared medications at the nurse station
from the stock cupboard.
Medication security and accessibility (1) A few
medicines (for example, nebules and pre-ﬁlled
syringes) were sometimes kept on the shelf at the
bottom of the drug trolley in addition to inside the
drug trolley which was accessible to passers-by; (2)
Some frequently used IV drugs (e.g., paracetamol
[acetaminophen] and metronidazole) were stored on
high shelves which made them difﬁcult to retrieve;
(3) Some patient bedside medication lockers were
positioned so that the locker opened towards the
bed to facilitate patient self-administration (rather
than towards the nurse opening it) which made it
more difﬁcult for the nurse to access the contents
when the patient was not self-medicating; (4) Nurses
had to stoop to open patient bedside medication
lockers.
Abbreviations: EMAR, electronic medication administration record; EPMA system, electronic prescribing
and medication administration system; HCA, health care assistant; HCP, health care professional; IV,
intravenous.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.t002
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Both potentially ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ system configurations and features for medication
safety were identified on each study ward; these were grouped under broad headings as in
Table 2. Nurses rarely commented on the benefits of existing medication systems and processes
on medication safety, workflow, interruptions or distractions; however nurses did report per-
ceived negative aspects as areas for improvement. In general, few nurses sought to resolve
underlying problems during the periods observed. In a number of cases, individuals seemed to
have accepted these and worked around the problem:
Nurse sometimes likes to put two drug trolleys together so she can prepare the medicines more
easily [implied medications were not always available from one drug trolley].
(Site A, comment documented during a drug round. Nurse had one year of experience
on the ward)
Nurse preferred to use the tablet computer over the computer on wheels (COW) as she found
the mouse pad tricky to use on the COW.However, she preferred to sign for medication
administrations at the desktop as the tablet computer was too small.
(Site B, comment documented during a drug round. Nurse had over seven years of expe-
rience on the ward)
Fig 2. Spaghetti diagram showing non-linear travel by one nurse (qualified 2 years, 1 year experience on study ward) during a noon drug round at
site A (map of ward not drawn to scale).Nurse started the drug round by wheeling the drug trolley from opposite the nurse station to side room D. Nurse
went to another drug trolley located near G bay (3 times): once each to find medication, a tablet cutter and a plastic medication cup. Nurse also walked and
attended to a patient other than the patient she was preparing medications for during the drug round (2 times), to the nurse station to look for a paper drug
chart (2), to the kitchen to retrieve nutritional supplement (1), and to help another nurse to exit the ward (1). S01, site code; DR001, drug round code; N01,
nurse code. Letters refer to ward bay areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g002
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Based on individual feedback and observations, the type of action taken to manage per-
ceived medication system related problems or inefficiencies seemed to partly depend on indi-
vidual behaviour types, which are next described.
‘Behaviour’—types of behaviour among nursing staff
As illustrated in Figs 2 to 5, medication administration was not a linear process; nurses encoun-
tered a number of tasks which took them to locations other than the patient’s bedside.
Observed variation between individual approaches to drug round tasks, even on the same
ward, suggests that workflow was not only influenced by structure-related configurations and
features, but also by behaviours that partly depended on the individual (‘inherent behaviour’)
and on the immediate environment in which medications were given (‘situational behaviour’).
Broadly, nurses appeared to have an inherent tendency to be either primarily ‘task focused’
(main goal of drug round appeared to be administer drugs as efficiently as possible), or
‘patient-interaction focused’ (drug round appeared to be an opportunity for the nurse to inter-
act with their patients in addition to administering medications). Excluding urgent tasks, task-
focused individuals generally used a streamlined workflow and carried out few non-medication
administration related tasks during the drug round; when the need for such tasks was identified
during the round, the nurse either deferred the task to the end of the round, or carried out the
Fig 3. Spaghetti diagram showing non-linear travel by one nurse (bank staff) during a morning drug round at site A (map of ward not drawn to
scale).Nurse started the drug round by wheeling the drug trolley from opposite the nurse station to side room D. Nurse went to the treatment room 11 times
during the drug round: to look for medicines in the stock cupboard (2 times),to prepare medications for intravenous administration (5), to look for the drug
chart (1) and to access the medicines fridge (3). During the drug round, the nurse also travelled to locations other than between the drug trolley and patients’
bedside: another drug trolley to look for medicines (4 times), nurse station to look for drug chart (1), nurse station to look for keys (2), kitchen to retrieve
nutritional supplement (1), to another nurse to provide handover of patients (2), and to the ward next door to look for medicine (1). S01, site code; DR006,
drug round code; N06, nurse code. Letters refer to ward bay areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g003
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task when another task took the nurse to a convenient location to carry out multiple tasks
together (Fig 6). By contrast, patient-interaction focused individuals adopted a relatively less
streamlined workflow, and appeared to encourage communication with patients and/or other
staff during the round; the patient-interaction focused individuals either multi-tasked, carried
out the non-medication administration related task shortly after they completed the primary
task, or stopped the primary task to carry out the non-medication administration related task.
Additionally, a number of self-reported intentional ‘alternative’ practices (‘non-conforming
behaviour’) from ward routines and trust policies were identified: some examples are presented
in Fig 7. We identified three main overlapping reasons for non-conformance: perceived ineffi-
cient process or system, clinical risk, and personal preference. The resulting action may or may
not violate policy.
Overall, all behaviour types had the potential to either increase or decrease medication
safety. Sometimes the alternative practice observed was part of an established tried-and-tested
routine for the individual; at other times it was more spontaneous. In general, the behaviour
types exhibited were not fixed; individuals appeared to shift from one to another, depending
on the needs of the patient, the medication system being used at the time, the task being carried
out, and other situational circumstances.
Fig 4. Spaghetti diagram showing non-linear travel by one nurse during night-time drug round at site
B (map of ward not drawn to scale).Nurse started the drug round by logging on to the tablet computer next
to the drug trolleys at 21:05, placed tablet computer on drug trolley and wheeled it to each patient starting in
C-bay. Nurse went to the nurse base station area 13 times during the drug round: to look for master key to
patient’s bedside medication locker (2 times), to look for medicines in stock cupboard (4), to access desktop
computer to view and/or sign patient medication orders (5), to take a telephone call (1), and to prepare from
the controlled drugs cupboard (2). Nurse ended the drug round at the nurse base station double checking on
the electronic prescribing and medication administration system that all the relevant doses had been signed.
S02, site code; DR022, drug round code; N18, nurse code. Letters refer to ward bay areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g004
Medication Administration Processes and Systems
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Given that the nurse him/herself was the third most common source of interruptions and
distractions (Fig 8), it is likely that individuals’ inherent tendencies may influence the potential
for MAEs. However, the ‘direction’ of influence (positive or negative) on drug round workflow
and MAEs depended on the medication systems being used and the task being carried out at
the time. By contrast, ‘other nurses’ were the most common source of interruptions and distrac-
tions to the nurse on the drug round. Observations suggest that these interruptions and distrac-
tions were frequently made by those who themselves were also involved in medication
administration around the same time; multiple nurses administered medications simulta-
neously to their own individual patients on two study wards and therefore the same medication
system problems were potentially affecting the nurses at the same time. The percentages of
other sources of interruptions and distractions are summarized in Fig 8; the presence of the
observer had a measurable effect on the number of interruptions and distractions experienced
by the nurse. However, the overall percentage of observer-related interruptions and distractions
was considerably less than those from patients despite the observer’s continued presence.
Patient interactions
As depicted in Fig 1, interactions between patients and nursing staff resulted in an observable
effect on medication safety and drug round workflow. Patients were the second most common
Fig 5. Spaghetti diagram showing changes in travel pattern of one nurse during a ‘two-nurse’ evening drug round at site C (map of ward not drawn
to scale). At site C, two nurses typically worked together on the drug round to administer medications to all patients; one nurse ‘caller’ and one nurse ‘runner’.
The diagram shows the path of travel by the nurse ‘caller’ who initially stayed with the drug trolley: she used the laptop attached to the drug trolley to access
the patient’s electronic medication administration record, called out doses to the ‘runner’ to retrieve medications from the bedside medication locker and
prepared some doses from the drug trolley. After preparing medicines for the patient in room 6, the nurse caller went ‘ahead’ while the nurse runner remained
to administer the doses; this process was repeated whenever a patient required assistance to take the medicines and led to a ‘single-nurse’ drug round for
parts of the remaining round. During the drug round, the nurse caller went to the nurse base station twice (to retrieve a patient‘s folder to check oxygen
saturation and to retrieve another patient’s folder for paper warfarin medication order) and treatment room once (to retrieve medication from the fridge). S03,
site code; DR045, drug round code; N34 and N31, nurse codes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g005
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source of interruptions and distractions during drug rounds (Fig 8) and therefore potentially
contributed to reduced medication safety. However, some nurse-patient interactions poten-
tially increased safety. Specifically, we found three manifestations of the patient being a defence
against medication errors: (1) patients as an active resource of information (volunteering infor-
mation about their medicines without prompting), (2) patients as a passive resource of infor-
mation (providing information about their medicines when asked or prompted), and (3)
patients acting as a ‘double-checker’ with the intention to check the medication being prepared
or administered (Table 3).
While patient interactions primarily related to relationships between nursing staff and the
patient, a number of system-related influences on these relationships were also observed. For
example, nurses typically did not take the computer on wheels (sites B and C) or drug trolley
(all sites) into patient side rooms (single-bed), and often relied on their memory and/or
brought medications out of the room to prepare doses, thus potentially reducing patient
Fig 6. Examples of inherent behavioural tendencies and associated influences on how systemswere utilized, and howmedication administration
related problems, interruptions, distractions, and workflow were managed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g006
Medication Administration Processes and Systems
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958 June 22, 2015 12 / 20
involvement. Patient involvement was important not only as a potential defence barrier for
MAEs but also to optimize their treatment. The dose omission rate due for clinical reasons,
such as a patient declining to take tramadol as it made them feel sick and they were not in any
pain, was 11.4% of 458 OEs, many of which were the result of direct nurse-patient interaction
during the drug round.
Discussion
This is the first study to combine qualitative and quantitative methods to explore how nurses
administer medications safely to hospital inpatients despite various challenges of the ward
environment. Variations in hospital ward medication systems in English NHS hospitals exist
[18,27] but we identified much more subtle variations than previously reported. Overall, medi-
cation administration is not a linear process, and we identified three inter-related themes that
acted as both facilitators and barriers to safe medication administration. The first relates to spe-
cific configurations and features of the ward-based medication system (theme 1). This in turn
can influence nursing staff behaviour (theme 2) in terms of workflow, how nurses manage
interruptions and distractions, and how they interact with patients (theme 3). Based on our
findings, a number of system-related nurse behaviour types were identified. Importantly,
nurses appeared to have a general inherent tendency to be either primarily ‘task focused’ (main
goal of drug round was to administer medications as efficiently as possible), or ‘patient-interac-
tion focused’ (drug round was an opportunity for the nurse to interact with their patients in
addition to administering medications) during the drug round. Both types of behaviour had
Fig 7. Threemain overlapping reasons for intentional ‘alternative’ practices identified from nurses’ feedback.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g007
Medication Administration Processes and Systems
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958 June 22, 2015 13 / 20
the potential to increase medication safety in different ways: task focused behaviour may lead
to a more streamlined and efficient workflow thereby minimizing interruptions and distrac-
tions that potentially contribute to MAEs [16], while patient-interaction focused behaviour
may lead to increased patient involvement with their medication thereby better enabling the
patient to act as a defence against errors. A focus on alternative practices also led to the identifi-
cation of three overlapping causes for intentional non-conformance. Analysis of alternative
practice behaviour was based on nurses’ feedback during the observations and was therefore
primarily associated with structure-based inefficiencies. Other unreported reasons for alterna-
tive practices were not explored. Nonetheless, our findings support previous research which
identified that “workarounds can [both] subvert and augment patient safety” [25]. Further-
more, by studying nurse behaviour types, our research suggests that potential latent conditions
for MAEs, analogous to the ‘resident pathogens’ described by Reason [13], can be identified by
examining non-conformance with typical local practices.
Consistent with the literature, patients sometimes acted as a defence barrier to medication
error [38]. We identified and conceptualized three ways in which patients acted as a defence,
emphasizing the importance of patient involvement in their medicines even in hospital. The
challenge is identifying how this can best be facilitated, while recognizing how this is likely to
change during different stages of the inpatient stay.
Implications for practice
In the UK, the high-profile Francis Report [6–8] highlighted inadequate nurse staffing (num-
bers, skill mix, knowledge and experience) as a major patient safety concern in one NHS trust.
Fig 8. Sources of interruptions and distractions during drug rounds percentage of a total of 413 interruptions and distractions observed at the
preparation, administration, and documentation stages of drug rounds).Median 5.5 interruptions per drug round hour, range 0 to 24; median 9.6
distractions per drug round hour, range 0 to 30; median 15.5 interruptions and distractions combined per drug round hour.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.g008
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However, our study highlights additional complex issues; it provides a timely insight into spe-
cific challenges of the work environment in three different wards and how nurses worked
within them to administer medications safely.
First, we have identified practical examples of resource optimization to increase medication
safety which may be used as a platform for further discussion within individual healthcare
Table 3. Three observed manifestations of the patient as a defence against medication errors.
Description Examples
Patients as an active resource of information
(volunteered information) about their medicines
• Patient highlighted discrepancy in pregabalin dose,
told the nurse it should be 250mg twice a day, but it
was prescribed as 100mg twice a day, nurse
documented this and talked to patient about changes
in medications. Later it was conﬁrmed that the wrong
dose had been prescribed (site C).
• Patient told the nurse that she (the patient) could
not break up the cocodamol [contains paracetamol
and codeine] and therefore did not take the dose that
was given to her in the previous drug round. The
dose had been signed as administered but was not
actually taken. Nurse was aware, helped patient
crush tablets by using two spoons (could not ﬁnd
tablet crusher on the ward) (site B).
Patients as a passive resource of information
(provided information when asked or prompted)
about their medicines
• Nurse noticed on the drug chart that the patient had
not received tinzaparin recently (there were two
doses crossed off and one blank administration box),
she asked the patient "do you know of any reason
why you haven't been given the tinzaparin?" "I get it
on dialysis" replied the patient. Tinzaparin had been
prescribed for once daily administration and there
was no documentation on the drug chart to indicate
that the patient was to receive this on dialysis days
only (site A).
• Nurse told the patient what she was giving (included
naproxen and omeprazole); patient explained he
takes both at night: “only take it at night” “not
morning?” “only take it at night” “ah they prescribed it
for this morning. . ...I don’t know why [they] prescribed
it for morning” explained to patient that she did not
give these last night and so patient took the
medications at the morning drug round (site B).
• Medication order did not specify which eye(s) to
which the eye drops were to be applied. Nurse asked
the patient, "your eye drops, do we do it for you or
you do it?" "You do it" "Is it both of the eyes?" Patient
conﬁrmed it was for the right eye, nurse administered
it to the patient’s right eye (site A).
Patient acted as a double-checker during drug
rounds
• Metformin dose prescribed was 500mg- 1g three
times a day on the drug chart and the prescriber had
written “1g OM” (meaning once daily in the morning)
in additional section of chart for metformin. Nurse
had prepared 500mg and given to patient during a
morning drug round but later corrected it when
prompted by the patient and gave 1g in total (site A).
• Nurse went straight to the patient’s bedside
medication locker to retrieve the patient’s own
gliclazide, omeprazole, metronidazole and
pioglitazone. During this time, the patient asked “is it
metformin?” Patient told the nurse that the metformin
was in the same packet as the gliclazide (site B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128958.t003
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organizations. Intuitive adoption of safe medication practice behaviours may be facilitated by
optimizing system configurations and features [39]. Optimizing ward-based medication sys-
tems to streamline workflow may therefore be an effective and cost-neutral way to increase
medication safety; this could include simple steps to ensure that all relevant medication, docu-
mentation and equipment is available in one place when needed during medication adminis-
tration (Table 2). However, how can potentially suboptimal processes and systems be
identified? Our research suggests that some nurses express their identification of known sys-
tem-based problems by developing routine alternative practices or workarounds. It is therefore
important that healthcare organizations engage effectively with ward staff to ‘tap into’ their
tacit knowledge of system problems. Direct observation is an important research method that
allows some of this tacit knowledge to be identified; however this approach is likely to be too
time-consuming to be of practical use on a regular basis. Instead, the use of ‘soft intelligence’,
for instance information gathered from conversations, observations and experiences, incorpo-
rated into regular routine multi-professional walkarounds may be more practical [40]. As
highlighted by Berwick [9] in his report on the Francis Inquiry, “most healthcare organizations
have very little capacity to analyse, monitor, or learn from safety and quality information”, and
therefore more inventive methods are needed. Hard information, such as objective and quanti-
tative data has long been used in the NHS and other healthcare institutions as an indicator of
performance. However research suggests the use of such information in isolation can be mis-
leading [41]. Evidence suggests that a combination of hard and soft information can be com-
plementary and allow better triangulation of findings on which to base decisions; the risk of
using soft information only is that decisions may be based on out of date anecdotes rather the
current experience [40,41].
Second, nurses are highly adaptable healthcare professionals who need to balance conflict-
ing priorities and demands during drug rounds. While medication administration is one of
many nursing tasks, research suggests that senior clinical nursing staff are concerned that their
staff are becoming overly task-focused in general and providing less patient-centred care [42].
In our study, we found both task focused and patient-interaction focused behaviour to have
different potential benefits. Our conceptual analysis of the two types of inherent nurse behav-
iour may therefore offer a way to facilitate behaviour change in nursing staff, for example, by
helping task focused nurses to better see the importance and benefits of a patient-interaction
focused approach, and vice versa for primarily patient-interaction focused nurses. This could
be based on a supportive peer-review process in which staff periodically observe each other’s
medication administration practices and consider the advantages and disadvantages of differ-
ent approaches. To further support the development of beneficial nurse-patient interactions,
we suggest efforts should also be focused on supporting nurses to manage interruptions and
distractions, some of which are potentially important and beneficial [43], rather than avoiding
them completely, as advocated elsewhere [16,31]. Further work should focus on characterising
and differentiating positive and negative interruptions, identifying strategies to prevent avoid-
able and non-urgent ‘delayable’ interruptions, and supporting nursing staff in addressing
important beneficial interruptions in an appropriate manner. In advocating an increase in
patient involvement with their medications (beyond self-administration) to enhance medica-
tion safety, it is also important to consider potential unintended consequences of actual or per-
ceived shifting of responsibility to the patient.
Finally, our research exemplified the potential benefits of the observational approach to
‘looking’ and ‘seeing’ practices in natural settings to identify safe practices that are not always
recognized or reported by staff. Thus, there is a need to use observational methods strategically
and share the findings across healthcare organisations to maximize their utility and increase
patient safety.
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Comparison of quantitative findings with previous research
The MAE rate for non-IV OEs identified in the present study (2.7%; 95% CI 1.2–4.2%) was
lower than previously reported in a systematic literature review of UK studies using similar
observational methods (5.6%; 95% CI 4.6–6.7%) [2]. The lower MAE rate may be partly due to
the relatively restricted range of medications used on the study wards; a large proportion of
patients were either admitted electively, transferred from another ward or undergoing rehabili-
tation. The present study identified a median rate of 5.5 interruptions per drug round hour and
9.6 distractions per drug round hour. The former is similar to the 6.7 interruptions per hour
reported in the literature review of Biron et al [31], based on a total of 2,622 interruptions
observed in 14 studies across a range of acute care settings. However, the definition of an inter-
ruption varied between studies and it was unclear whether or not the interruption rates
reported by Biron et al [31] included ‘distractions’, which we defined and reported separately.
Strengths and limitations
Strengths of our research were (1) inclusion of multiple wards that used distinctly different medi-
cation systems to reflect some of the diversity of practices within the English NHS, (2) using an
ethnographic approach, rather than self-report, to identify ‘real-world’ practices, (3) using a
mixed-methods approach to triangulate our findings, and (4) reporting quantitative data based
on established methods and definitions to facilitate comparison with previous studies. Further-
more, informal feedback from nursing staff about the observation experience was generally posi-
tive and the presence of the observer was not perceived to be a problem. Staff seemed generally
quite open about their opinions of the systems relating to medication administration and pro-
vided invaluable additional insights into their rationale for approaches taken during drug rounds.
Sociotechnical interactions are complex; there are multiple interconnecting systems and
processes that are not always apparent. Limitations of our research were that (1) we did not
explore the wider impact of system optimization on the work processes of other health care
professionals, (2) we did not explore other individual nurse or environmental factors, such as
age and qualifications, or noise and lighting, that may be associated with nursing errors and
efficiency [44], (3) our study was not powered to detect quantitative differences between wards,
such as the effect of paper versus electronic systems on medication safety, or the relationship
between structural factors and errors, distractions or interruptions—our findings may be used
to design quantitative studies to explore these issues, (4) despite efforts made to maintain a bal-
ance between objectivity and subjectivity (e.g. encouraging feedback from nursing staff and col-
lection of objective data to support our interpretation), data were collected by one researcher to
facilitate the formative nature of ethnographic research and therefore may be limited to some
degree by the beliefs and experience of the researcher. Furthermore, findings from the interrup-
tions and distractions recorded in the current study indicate the presence of the observer had a
measurable influence on nurse behaviour during drug rounds. Thus, the observer may have
influenced MAE rates in a positive way through the Hawthorne effect. However, it is also possi-
ble that the observer increased the risk of an MAE by being a distraction to the nurse. While
previous studies suggest that there is no effect of observation on MAE rates provided the
observer is discreet, non-judgmental, and tactful [45,46], our study was not designed to quan-
tify this further. We suggest future observational studies of MAEs consider documenting the
frequency of participant-observer interactions.
Conclusion
Overall, a number of subtle structural variations in available resources appear to influence indi-
vidual nurse behaviour and patient interactions, with some notable positive and negative
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unintentional consequences on medication safety. Our findings suggests that efforts to reduce
MAEs be focused on three main areas (1) optimization of ward-based medication systems, (2)
supporting nurses to manage interruptions and distractions, and (3) actively encouraging inpa-
tient involvement with their medications where appropriate.
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